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A lively debate followed the release of two IPC One Pagers that
contrasted Ravallion’s and Kakwani’s definitions of ‘pro-poor growth’.
According to Ravallion (World Bank), ‘pro-poor growth’ is any growth in
mean income that benefits poor people – a definition Kakwani (IPC) finds
wanting as it would encompass the vast majority of growth episodes so
long as poverty decreases, which it typically does. He proposes instead
that growth is pro-poor if it benefits the poor proportionally more than
the non-poor. In the exchange that followed, it became clear that what is
considered ‘pro-poor’ depends, in part, on the choice of standards for
gauging the distributional impact of a growth episode.
Ravallion’s definition does not seem to pass a reasonable test of ‘pro-
poorness’. In the words of Howard White (Sussex), a growth episode that
gives every rich person $1 million and just 1 cent to a single poor person
cannot possibly be deemed pro-poor – especially considering that, in most
instances of rapid growth with rising inequality, the prices of basic needs
items consumed by the poor tend to grow faster than the prices faced by
the average person, as Dave Gordon (Bristol) noted. Alberto Minujin
(Unicef) dismissed Ravallion’s statement about the poverty-reducing impact
of growth as merely an empirical observation, not a definition. Pro-poor
growth does not just happen; it is the result of explicit policies – and this is
as true for income poverty as for other dimensions of well-being. Citing a
recent Unicef study, Minujin shows that disparities in child well-being –
specifically in the reduction of U5MR – between rich and poor worsened
during the 1990s in countries that failed to follow pro-poor policies. If they
had, the consequences for child well-being could have been dramatic: the
number of ‘lives saved’ would have doubled if every household had enjoyed
the same U5MR reduction as those in the top quintile.
Michael Lipton (Sussex) prefers to call ‘strongly pro-poor’ that growth
process in which incomes rise proportionally faster for the poor than the
non-poor. But unlike Kakwani, he reserves the term ‘weakly pro-poor’ for
those instances in which growth benefits the poor considerably, albeit
less than the non-poor. Much of the disagreement concerning pro-poor
growth would dissipate if one could establish empirically the tradeoffs
between changes in absolute poverty and in inequality between rich
and poor. For Lipton, it is not enough to say that ‘inequality matters’.
Distribution between the richest and second-richest deciles may not be
relevant to whether growth is pro-poor; distribution between the poor
and the non-poor is, and so is distribution around the poverty line.
Like Lipton, Siddiqur Osmani (Ulster) agrees with both Kakwani and
Ravallion, though only up to a point. Simply reducing poverty cannot be
a sufficient condition for growth to be pro-poor. There has to be a bias in
favor of the poor. But Osmani questions some of the implications of
Kakwani’s ‘pro-poor’ criterion. A country with high growth may reduce
poverty more than one with sluggish growth, even if the poor reap
proportionally fewer benefits than the non-poor in the former and more
in the latter. Yet by Kakwani’s definition, the country with the better record
of poverty reduction would have a less pro-poor performance than the
country with the weaker record. So while agreeing that the true test of
‘pro-poorness’ is the existence of a policy bias in favor of the poor, Osmani
proposes that this bias be defined differently – not in relation to how well
the non-poor do, but in relation to a country’s past record of poverty
reduction. He then defines ‘pro-poor growth’ as a growth process that
reduces poverty more as compared to the ‘benchmark’ scenario. This will
clearly vary across countries and over time so that what is pro-poor
growth in one case may not be so in another.
Frances Stewart (Oxford) endorses Osmani’s approach, but not his specific
choice of benchmark. Osmani’s criterion might, for instance, disqualify an
egalitarian country with a good track record of poverty reduction if, in the
future, it underperformed but still did reasonably well as compared to other
countries. Stewart thus suggests an alternative approach that  identifies, for
each country, the growth rate that would halve poverty by 2015. In turn,
Howard White proposes three different criteria of ’pro-poorness’.  The first
calls for the share of the poor in income growth to exceed their existing
share. About half of all growth episodes qualify as pro-poor by this
definition, which White considers weak as it may coexist with a growing
absolute gap between rich and poor. A second criterion, which very few
past growth episodes meet, requires that the poor´s share in incremental
growth surpass their share in population; in other words, the absolute gap
between rich and poor should not widen during growth.  The third and final
accords with Stewart’s in that the share of the poor in incremental growth
exceeds some international norm. By this definition, about half of growth
episodes are pro-poor, though not the same half as by the first criterion.
Finally, Quentin Wodon (World Bank) calls for more robust tests of pro-
poor distributional changes. Simple average relationships between
growth and summary poverty measures, such as headcount changes,
are inadequate because they depend on the effect of growth on those
closest to the poverty line, making judgements highly sensitive to the
choice of poverty lines. Besides, growth may reduce the proportion of
a country’s poor, but with adverse impacts on the very poor. Thus, a key
issue when assessing ‘pro-poorness’ is whether to give more weight to
the poorer of the poor. Another issue is whether to use a relative or
absolute standard for measuring distributional changes.
So after all is said and done, when can growth be deemed pro-poor?
Well, the jury is out. Stay tuned for more.